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RECENT BOOKS 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAw. By David Mellinkoff. Little, 
Brown and Co. 1963. Pp. xiv, 454. $12.50. 
The language of the law should be judged on the basis of its 
esthetics or itsv efficiency. David Mellinkoff's recent book, entitled 
The Language of the Law, is a massive examination of the failure 
of law language by either criterion. Directed against a profession 
which is so innately involved in the business of communication, 
this is a critical and serious indictment. The charge is supported 
by devastating scholarship and thoroughness. 
The Language of the Law is partly an historical and encyclo-
pedic etymology of law words, wordings, and cliches, and partly a 
running editorial commentary by the author on what is wrong with 
legal language. The book is written in numbered sections of sepa-
rate thoughts with abundant and valuable footnotes (on each page). 
However, the author erratically alternates between a dullish, scho-
lastic style and a staccato, jaunty, journalistic style. Consequently, 
while the idea of the book is important and interesting, its execution 
is often uneven, and at times the book is difficult to read. Nevertheless, 
one should enjoy and must respect this book. 
In the early chapters, the author views the historical antecedents 
of modern American legal language. He begins his analysis of the 
history of legal words with Celtic, which was the first dominant 
language in England. The next influence was that of the Saxons 
and Jutes (450 A.D.), who came from Denmark and Germany and 
left a Teutonic influence on the prevailing speech. From then 
until the Norman Conquest in 1066, Old English prevailed, and 
from this we have taken such words as "manslaughter," "ward," 
"wife," "deed," and "guilty." The Norse and the Old English in 
the period from 700 to 1000 were not far apart, and the author 
cites a fascinating example of the derivatjon of one phrase from 
both sources. "Crook" in Old Norse and "hook" in Old English 
meant a bent piece of metal. Later, "crook" came to mean some-
thing wrong or dishonest. And, by the 14th century, "by hook or 
by crook" meant to steal. 1 Tidbits like this fill the book and will 
delight the reader who is curious about the sources of words and 
phrases. 
With the rising influence of the Church on secular affairs, Latin 
became a part of the everyday language in England. The Church 
had a great impact upon the administration of justice, and the 
clergy composed a large percentage of the literate scriveners and 
scholars. Before this, illiteracy was common and most legal transac-
1. P. 55. 
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tions were oral. Latin was the universal language of medieval learn-
ing, and its residue is evident, both in legal language still in use 
(res ipsa loquitur, habeas corpus, subpoena) and in Latin deriva-
tives (debt, advocate, incorporate). In this regard, the author's ex-
planation of the derivation of "indenture" is delightful. Latin also 
combined with existing English and with French, which became 
the "language of learning and gentility"2 after the Norman Con-
quest. French went through periods of rising and falling favor in 
England. Although its role was less obvious than that of Latin, 
French also played an influential part in molding our law language 
(descent, justice, marriage, possession). We still use some French 
phrases such as "cy pres" and "fee tail." Middle English in the 
period from 1100 to 1500 joined Anglo-Saxon with Latin and 
French. This combination gave us such phrases of mixed etymolog-
ical genealogy as "breaking and entering" (Old English and 
French), "peace and quiet" (Latin and Old English), "will and 
testament" (Old English and Latin), and "free and clear" (Old 
English and French). 
The author develops this history through such later develop-
ments as the invention of the printing press and the rise of literacy, 
written reports, dictionaries, law schools, and eventually he leads the 
reader into modem English and modem American law language.3 
Here he leaves etymology for criticism and appraisal, and, in so doing, 
Mr. Mellinkoff falls victim to some of his own perceptive criticisms of 
legal writing-most particularly repetition and redundancy. How-
ever, his thesis, "the language of the law should not be different 
without a reason,"4 is more than adequately, and often interestingly, 
substantiated. Unfortunately, the author spends an inordinate 
amount of his time in showing why law language is not more pre-
cise, shorter, more intelligible, or more durable than general En-
glish. 5 
The public impression and prestige of the legal profession 
suffers as a result of the· language of the law. The average person 
comes in contact with special legal language in one of several 
typical situations: he encounters a lawyer socially, or deals with 
one professionally; he reads a legal document or a law; or, he is in 
court in some capacity at a trial. Mr. Mellinkoff says: 
"When the juror is told that he must follow the law as 
laid down by the judge, and he cannot follow the words-let 
alone the law-this frustration does not promote respect. 
When the harried businessman is overwhelmed with the lan-
2. P. 70. 
!l. Pp. 240-50. 
4. P. 285. 
5. Pp. 290-454. 
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guage confusions of the government he is taxed to support and 
of the professionals he pays to help him, his feelings for the 
law and for lawyers are not properly described as respectful. 
"Respect for law is no mere matter of words; neither in-
telligibility nor precision nor ritual will sell bad law indefi-
nitely. But bad language usage can hurt good law; good lan-
guage usage can promote respect for good law. And for the rest 
of this language-conscious century, an important part of the 
layman's attitude toward the law will be determined by what 
the profession does with its language."6 
The average lawyer talks and writes poorly about the law. As 
a result, what is intrinsically the most fascinating and dramatic 
profession is too frequently considered a technical, gimmicky, 
closed-door society. Legal language can be, and has been, criticized 
on two levels. First, its technical execution is poor, primarily be-
cause an alarming number of lawyers are not well educated in basic 
composition, spelling, and punctuation. This fact was aired recently 
when the dean of one major law school publicly criticized the low 
level of literateness of law students, and the dean of another fa-
mous law school complained about how unsatisfactorily lawyers write 
about the law for laymen. The improvement of early education 
plays a major part in the solution to this problem. More than any 
other profession, the law is particularly suited to a strong ground-
ing in the liberal arts. I remember being surprised when a law 
school official advised me that the best college preparation for law 
school would be one that stressed English before other general 
liberal arts subjects. I am certain now that this advice was correct. 
Second, the profession has propagated a mysticism of cant which 
not only constitutes a poor choice of language, but also frequently 
does not accurately communicate. Mr. Mellinkoff devotes most of 
his criticism to this latter fault. 
By either public or in-group standards, the language of the law 
is wanting. There is a vast potential audience that would like to 
know about the significant social issues being dealt with so often, 
of late, in our courts and legislatures. The legal profession should 
not relinquish to journalism the responsibility for telling this story. 
There is too much that journalists cannot know and therefore can-
not tell. But few lawyers ·write well enough to do the job (and, in 
fairness, it should be added that some who do have an ability to 
write do not have the time). Accordingly, journalists have assumed 
the task by default. There is a critical need for mature and effective 
writing about such subjects as congressional investigations, censor-
ship of movies and obscene "literature," publicity and trials, the 
6. P. 453. 
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ideological conflicts within the Supreme Court, divorce and adop-
tion laws, and countless other social and political issues of our 
time about which lawyers often have special knowledge and ex-
perience. Yet, most of what the lay public sees of the law is bilge; 
quality work is rare. The proof of the value of good treatment is 
that when something of quality is done it is a roaring success. 
People love the stuff of the law. I often wonder why the most per-
ceptive and sensitive writer about trials is Sybille Bedford.7 Pos-
sibly it is because lawyers cannot resist personalizing the legal ex-
perience. Louis Nizer's deeds are fascinating and of real general 
interest; Louis Nizer is not. Perhaps there should be more concen-
tration on training for legal writing. Lawyers could be trained 
specially for writing precisely as journalists are trained in the law 
by Harvard's Nieman program. Few law schools give any attention 
to this type of training in their curricula. The Yale Law School, 
however, does offer such a course; the students love it; and its 
graduates have published significantly. 
Perhaps even worse than legal writing for laymen is the fact 
that the case books are full of examples of lawyers' professional 
writing failures in their own arenas. Mr. Mellinkoff cites abun-
dantly from these. He shows that some of the words which lawyers 
use specially cause their clients problems and that following the 
formbook is not the safest route. This latter point was graphically 
displayed to me in a law classroom exercise. The instructor had 
each of us in my class draft a will. We all borrowed liberally from 
the formbooks. A standard formbook clause for wills (and one I have 
since seen colleagues use in wills) says something to the effect that 
"I direct my executor to pay all my just debts." This little gratuity 
is thrown in though few clients ever ask for it. It sounds good 
and lawyery. However, a New York court once ruled that this 
clause revived a debt which had been barred from collection by 
the statute of limitations. Mr. Mellinkoff offers many more strik-
ing instances where poor legal language or punctuation has caused 
litigation or brought about unwanted results. Legal formalities 
also cause trouble, and the author gives examples of archaic uses of 
words which are not only vague but wrong and troublesome (afore-
said, forthwith, and/or, said).8 Lawyers love to duplicate words. 
All they usually accomplish is to confound9 when they use such 
words as "aid and comfort," "by and with," "cease and desist," 
"had and received," "fit and proper," and the all-time favorite, "give, 
7. Her books, THE FACES OF JUSTICE (1961) and AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRIAL OF JOHN 
BODKIN ADAMS (1958), are the most astute and brilliant perceptions of the trial process 
which I have ever read. 
8. Pp. !105-20. 
9. Pp. !1!10-60. 
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bequeath, and devise," which sometimes has appended to it a 
"grant" and a few other nuances just to be sure. As Mr. Mellinkoff 
points out: 
"The drafting lawyer thinks big and fast. He wants to 
cover it all, and the quickest way to do it is in the manner it 
has most often been done before, in the manner he is most 
familiar with. Include! Don't select. Adopt and multiply! 
Don't choose between 'inhabitant' and 'resident.' Make it 'in-
habitant actually resident.' "10 
Even the advent of written law reports did not bring about the 
stability, durability, or precision which might have been expected. 
Every lawyer can find a case going the opposite way on the interpreta-
tion of "accidental," "proximate," or even "never" or whatever word 
is in issue. All the effort of legalese is lost. 
The only compensating aspect of the imprecision of legal words 
is in the area of developing constitutional law where intended 
flexibility is valuable. The words "reasonable," "freedom," "equal 
protection," and "due process of law" need constant redefinition 
in light of changing times and mores. The story is told that after 
Solon wrote the ancient Greek constitution he left the country for 
several years so that he would not be called upon to say what he 
meant by this word and that. This kind of interpretation is better 
left to the Frankfurters and Blacks and to the inspiration of the times. 
This does not, however, carry over to statutory language. Mr. 
Mellinkoff gives an excellent illustration of the differences between 
good and bad language explaining a law.11 
"Penal Code section 384 "State law requires you to 
makes it a misdemeanor for hang up the receiver of a 
any person who shall will- party line telephone im-
fully refuse fo immediately mediately when told the 
relinquish a telephone par- line is needed for an emer-
ty-line when informed that gency call .... It is unlaw-
such line is needed for an ful to take over a party line 
emergency call. . . . Also, by stating falsely that the 
any person who shall se- line is needed for an emer-
cure the use of a telephone gency." 
party-line by falsely stating 
that such line is needed for 
an emergency call shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor.'' 
If most statutes are hard for lawyers, let alone the lay public, 
to read, the language which is descriptive of legal arrangements is 
10. Pp. 363-64. 
11. P. 430. 
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worse. I have never understood what is and what is not covered by 
my Blue Cross insurance contract. 
Courtroom talk is also more baffling than it needs to be. The 
anecdotes are legion of straight-talking witnesses destroying pom-
pous-sounding trial lawyers by translating legalese into common 
sense in uproarious or embarrassing ways. I will always remember 
a Kentucky judge telling a jury in one case I tried that he wished 
he did not have to give them long-winded technical instructions. 
Instead, he said, he would prefer to tell them what Andrew Jackson 
told a jury when he was on the bench in Tennessee: "Go out and 
do right by these people." This is what juries do most of the time 
anyway-when they aren't so confused that they do the wrong 
thing for the right (or wrong) reason. As Mr. Mellinkoff states: 
"[M]any of these instructions are not designed for the quick under-
standing of listening laymen, but rather for more or less intelligible 
reading by appellate judges."12 He cites an example: 
"During the course of these instructions the term 'burden 
of proof' will be used. By 'burden of proof' is meant the duty 
resting upon the party having the affirmative of an issue .to 
satisfy or convince the jury to a reasonable certainty of the 
truth of the contentions of that party .... 
"By 'preponderance of the evidence' is meant the evidence 
which possesses the greater weight or convincing power. It is 
not enough that the evidence of the party upon whom the bur-
den of proof rests is of slightly greater weight or convincing 
power; it must go further and satisfy or convince the minds of 
the jury before the burden of proof is discharged. 
"What a letdown! The judge would have done his job 
much better telling the jury: 'Jones brought this case to court 
and it is his job to satisfy you that Smith hit him.' "13 
So, we can conclude that in style and in function legal language 
is in need of improvement. This theme is not new; in fact, much 
has already been written about this subject, and Mr. Mellinkoff's 
bibliography is an excellent collation of these materials. However, 
the theme is worth stressing and repeating, and this book does both 
well. In the early part of this century a group of European artists 
began a reform movement from which we are all still benefiting. 
Such famous men as Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius, 
Paul Klee, Vasily Kandinsky, and Marcel Breuer began their own 
school in Germany, and many of the future's form-givers and taste-
makers developed a new form for artistic expression which was 
their own. Essentially they showed that meaningless expression 
should play no part in art and that art should reflect the mode of 
12. P. 434. 
13. P. 433. 
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its time. Perhaps the legal profession should include in its modem 
schooling something of the Bauhaus philosophy. 
Ronald L. Goldfarb 
Member,New York and 
California Bars 
